Originally published at: 农业资本主义发展的两条道路与中国农业现状 – 曙光
The Two Paths of Agricultural Capitalism Development and the Current Situation of Chinese Agriculture
Editorial Board of League of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Proletariat
From the late 18th century to the early 20th century, with the completion of the Industrial Revolution and the development of capitalism in agriculture, the capitalist system was fully established in major capitalist countries in Europe and America and in Japan. As a result of the development of capitalist relations in rural areas, the capitalist land ownership system appeared. Furthermore, with the further development of agricultural capitalism, except for a small portion of peasant small land ownership, all other non-capitalist land ownership gradually transformed into capitalist land ownership. Although due to differences in social and historical conditions among countries, this process took different forms in various nations, generally speaking, there are still two main paths: one is the “American-style path,” and the other is the “Prussian-style path.” Along different routes, agricultural capitalism developed with distinct characteristics in each country.
“American-style path” refers to the route of thoroughly destroying feudal land relations through bourgeois revolution, universally establishing peasant small land ownership, and forming large capitalist land ownership and capitalist farms during the differentiation of small farmers. This path is called the “American-style path” because it is most prominently manifested in the United States. Before the War of Independence, the British North American colonies had three types of land ownership: in the North, where colonies were mainly settled by impoverished European immigrants, they often allocated land themselves after establishing towns, creating small farms for self-cultivation. In the Central region, small land ownership by farmers was also widespread, along with feudal large land ownership by British landlord aristocrats, who took over large Dutch colonial estates, divided the land into small plots rented to impoverished immigrants, and extracted rent and feudal exploitation. In the South, due to fertile land and warm climate suitable for extensive large plantations, British colonists established large plantations using slave labor and white contract slaves. Land issues were among the key conflicts between colonists and British rulers. To protect landlord interests, Britain issued laws prohibiting colonists from moving west of the Appalachian Mountains, preventing them from escaping feudal exploitation. This caused dissatisfaction among farmers and southern plantation owners eager to expand plantation land, and among merchants involved in land speculation, leading to the outbreak of the American Revolutionary War. The war (1775–1783) achieved American independence, eliminated feudal remnants within the country, confiscated the land of pro-British landlords, and abolished feudal land ownership, corvée rent, and other feudal legal rights. However, the land issue for farmers was not fully resolved after independence—federal government sold large blocks of land at high prices, making it impossible for impoverished farmers to buy, leading to large land transfers to capitalists and plantation owners. In 1786, Daniel Shays led an uprising demanding land nationalization, redistribution, and abolition of land taxes. Under the Shays Rebellion and the farmers’ “forced resettlement” struggles, the federal government was compelled to reduce the size and price of land parcels, leading to widespread small farm development in the West. The rise of commodity economy, capitalist industry, and transportation accelerated the differentiation of small farmers that had begun during the colonial period, promoting the development of capitalist relations and land ownership in agriculture, which rapidly advanced American agricultural production after independence. From 1800 to 1860, the total value of American agriculture increased about 5.4 times, with an average annual growth of 3.1%. By 1860, grain production was about 30.96 million tons, with per capita possession close to one ton. During this period, new tools, machinery, and equipment also developed.
However, the American Revolution did not eliminate slavery-based plantations. After the war, plantation owners aggressively expanded westward, forcibly occupying newly cultivated lands, and attempted to implement slavery in all new territories. Land disputes between northern farmers and capitalists and southern plantation owners became a major cause of the Civil War. During the Civil War, defeats on the front lines and rising mass movements forced the federal government to enact the Homestead Act, which allowed immigrants to claim up to 160 acres of wasteland for a fee of $10. Many farmers acquired land in the West, and small farm ownership rapidly developed. After the Civil War, slavery was abolished nationwide, and plantation lands were divided into small plots rented to Black tenants (though they still suffered brutal exploitation under a semi-slavery sharecropping system). Meanwhile, capitalists acquired four times more land than farmers through railroads and speculation organizations, establishing large capitalist farms with advanced machinery and large-scale cultivation. The brutal competition among capitalist farms, along with layers of exploitation by merchants, usurers, and industrial capitalists, greatly accelerated the differentiation of small farmers: a small number of farmers rose to become agricultural capitalists, while the vast majority fell into poverty and bankruptcy, with their lands bought by capitalist agricultural organizations, and they themselves becoming agricultural workers. By 1910, out of 13.55 million agricultural workers nationwide, a quarter (3.38 million) were farm laborers. At the same time, farms employing hired labor and operating with capitalist methods not only increased in number but also gained a higher status in agricultural production: in 1910, about one-sixth of all farms, these capitalist large farms, produced more than half of the country’s agricultural output value. The rapid development of capitalist relations in agriculture led to a significant increase in U.S. agricultural output: in 1870, wheat, corn, and cotton yields reached 690,000, 2,790,000, and 870,000 tons respectively, tripling or nearly tripling the 1840 yields; by 1900, these crops increased further to 16.32 million, 68.58 million, and 2.17 million tons, respectively, 68, 71, and 7 times the 1840 levels. Today, American agriculture is highly developed. The U.S. is the world’s largest exporter of agricultural products, accounting for about one-fifth of global production. Its outputs of poultry, beef, pork, soybeans, wheat, corn, and potatoes rank among the top three globally, often first. The reason lies in the development path of agricultural capitalism initiated by the American Revolution.
Across the Atlantic in France, agricultural capitalism also developed along the “American-style path.” Before the Revolution, feudal land ownership dominated France, with nobles, the king, and the Catholic Church owning all land. Landlords rented out small plots to farmers, exploiting them through heavy rent, taxes, and corvée labor, with rent alone accounting for one-third to one-half of the harvest. Feudal states and the Church also extorted various taxes and tithes from farmers. To pay these burdens, farmers often mortgaged land to usurers, and when unable to repay, land was seized, only to be rented back. Under such brutal exploitation, French agriculture was extremely backward: until the eve of the Revolution, France still widely practiced the medieval three-field or two-field crop rotation system, with an annual grain growth rate of only 0.4%. But where there is oppression, resistance follows. French farmers rose in rebellion against feudal exploitation. Their anti-feudal struggles intensified, especially during the 1789–1793 Revolution, which completely destroyed feudal land systems. Driven by farmers’ movements, the Jacobins abolished all feudal obligations, confiscated estates of fleeing nobles, royal family, and church, and sold land at low prices to farmers. Public land previously controlled by feudal lords was redistributed. Small land ownership became widespread in France. Meanwhile, the bourgeoisie seized large amounts of land during the revolution, and some noble lands were retained afterward. The differentiation of small farmers and the capitalist farming of the bourgeoisie and aristocrats promoted the development of capitalist production relations in French agriculture. By 1862, France had 150,000 capitalist farms, occupying 40% of cultivated land, with over 900,000 workers, and an agricultural output value of 7.5 billion francs—twice that after the Revolution. However, compared to the U.S., small land ownership in France persisted longer because, after the revolution, the long-term control of the bourgeoisie and feudal landlords allowed usury capital to flourish in rural areas. To usurers, keeping small farmers in debt and land allowed continued exploitation, which was more profitable than confiscating land outright. The long existence of impoverished small farmers hindered technological and machinery adoption, limited population growth and free labor formation, causing French agriculture to lag behind the U.S. (in 1880, France’s wheat yield was 3.75 million tons, far below the U.S., but still ahead of Germany’s 2.35 million). Nonetheless, because the development of agricultural capitalism in France was ultimately a revolutionary path, its agricultural production remains globally advanced today: accounting for half of Europe’s total grain output, second only to the U.S. in agricultural exports, with a trade surplus of 10.3 billion euros in 2022.
“Prussian-style path” refers to a route of slow transformation of feudal land relations through top-down reforms, maintaining feudal land ownership and residual feudal structures, gradually converting landlord estates into capitalist farms using semi-serf labor. This path is called the “Prussian-style path” because it is most typical in Prussia. In Germany before the 19th century, serfdom was widespread, with feudal lords controlling large landholdings. Influenced by the French Revolution, the Prussian government was forced to implement “agricultural reforms,” allowing farmers to buy out some feudal obligations, but without touching the land ownership of Junker aristocrats. After the 1848 revolution, the government issued new laws, abolishing some minor feudal obligations and permitting farmers to buy land rent and labor services at high prices. This reform, which did not challenge feudal land ownership, allowed Junker landlords to retain and seize as much land as possible (by the early 1860s, Junkers and wealthy farmers owned 91% of cultivated land in Germany), while extracting large redemption money from farmers, transforming their estates into semi-serf, bourgeois farms. Tenant farmers remained personally dependent on landlords, suffering both capitalist and feudal exploitation. The abundance of cheap labor prevented landlords from adopting new technologies, slowing agricultural development: in 1880 and 1890, wheat yields in Germany were 86.5 million and 104 million bushels, only 17.2% and 23.2% of U.S. yields in the same years. Farmers’ poverty also hindered domestic market expansion and economic growth, causing the German bourgeoisie and Junker landlords to increasingly collude in seeking foreign markets and territories, making German militarism more aggressive.
The development of capitalist agriculture in Russia is another typical example of the “Prussian-style path.” In the 19th century before reforms, feudal landownership by noble landowners dominated Russia. By the first half of the 19th century, serfdom had become a serious obstacle to Russian capitalist agriculture, with frequent poor harvests and famines. Under these conditions, the anti-serfdom movement surged, with 108 peasant uprisings and rebellions in 1860 alone. The revolutionary situation was very favorable, and the feudal rule of Russian landowners was collapsing. However, due to the dispersed and spontaneous nature of the peasant movement, their struggles were suppressed. Moreover, the Russian bourgeoisie and bourgeoisified landlords were extremely weak, advocating only reform, so Russia did not experience a thorough bourgeois revolution to overthrow feudalism but only a top-down serfdom reform. In 1861, Tsar Alexander II issued a decree allowing peasants to buy out some feudal obligations and rent land from landlords after paying large redemption fees. Although this reform began the transition of Russian social relations toward capitalism, it still retained the land ownership of landowners (later landlords). Based on this, Russian landlords gradually improved their management: initially maintaining a mixed system of remnants of serfdom and capitalist wage labor (peasants working on landlord land and bearing some feudal obligations in exchange for land rent or monetary pay), then shifting to a more productive capitalist wage labor system. After the serf reform, Russian agriculture grew somewhat but remained backward for a long time: from 1864 to 1905, grain output increased from 152 million to 396 million Russian poods, a 160% increase over forty years. While this was a significant progress compared to the long stagnation during serfdom (usually around 110 million Russian poods or less), the growth rate was still far behind that of the U.S. at the same time. Additionally, the reform preserved the dominance of the Russian aristocratic landlords, turning Russia into a semi-colony of the landlord class—“In Russia, imperialist capitalism is relatively weak, while military feudal imperialism is relatively strong”[1]. Under these circumstances, Russia intensified its external expansion and plunder through military force to compensate for its underdeveloped financial capital in the struggle for global dominance.
Of course, real and complex social and historical developments inevitably have exceptions. Besides the revolutionary “American path” and the reformist “Prussian path,” there is a special case in Britain. Britain’s bourgeois revolution did not thoroughly destroy the feudal land system battered by peasant uprisings, nor did it completely eliminate the landlord class. Instead, it ultimately moved toward a compromise: the 1381 Wat Tyler uprising destroyed feudal serfdom, making Britain a country where small landownership and clan communal land coexist with feudal landownership. In 1640, due to peasant opposition to enclosure movements and feudal exploitation, and conflicts between the emerging bourgeoisie, new aristocrats, and the Stuart monarchy, Britain’s bourgeois revolution broke out. However, this “revolution” ended with a compromise between bourgeoisie and landlords in 1688, establishing a constitutional monarchy with joint rule. Most confiscated lands of the king, royalists, and church fell into the hands of the bourgeoisie and new aristocrats, not solving the land issues of peasants but consolidating and expanding large landlord landownership. After gaining political power, the bourgeoisie and new aristocrats used parliamentary legislation to launch larger enclosure movements. By the mid- to late 18th century, self-sufficient peasant farms and communal lands in Britain disappeared, with peasants losing their land and becoming either laborers, tenants, or migrating to cities or colonies. The scope of large landlord landownership and large tenant farms continued to expand, leading to the complete formation of capitalist agriculture in Britain. Although the development of capitalist agriculture through the establishment of advanced machinery farms significantly advanced British agriculture: in 1650, wheat yield was only 10.45 bushels per acre; by 1750, it reached 17.26 bushels, and further increased to 26.69 bushels with widespread machinery use by 1850[2]. However, the monopoly of large landlord landownership caused high rents, and British agricultural products remained expensive, ultimately leading to the decline of British agriculture under the pressure of cheap American imports in the late 19th century. Between 1870 and 1910, Britain’s wheat sowing area and yield halved, and self-sufficiency dropped from 79% to 35.6%. After becoming a “sunset” colonial empire, Britain’s parasitism deepened with massive capital exports to colonies and other countries, further impacting agriculture: less and less financial and human resources were invested, large arable lands turned into exploiters’ playgrounds, no longer used for production. Today, British agriculture is in decline: food self-sufficiency is only 60%, total grain output in 2021 was less than 22.4 million tons, ranking about twenty-fifth in the world. Clearly, an incomplete revolution inevitably leads to compromise and reform, and the path of compromise and reform is ultimately a dead end.
In summary, whether it is a bottom-up revolution or a top-down reform, whether it is the abolition of the landlord class or its consolidation, whether it is the elimination of feudal production relations or the retention of many feudal remnants—these are the fundamental differences between the two paths of agricultural capitalism development. Therefore, choosing the “American-style path” or the “Prussian-style path” has profound implications for a country’s agricultural production and entire national economy.
Above, we briefly analyzed the different paths of capitalist agricultural development in Europe and America. Next, based on the general laws of capitalist agriculture development, we will attempt to explain the current situation of Chinese agriculture under imperialism. As mentioned earlier, in France, the long-standing existence of small-scale peasant economy hindered the adoption of advanced technology and large-scale agricultural organization; in Britain, the dominance of large landlord landownership resulted in high absolute and differential rents. In contemporary China, where capitalist restoration and the disintegration of the people's communes have occurred, small-scale peasant economy still exists extensively. Moreover, under the guise of “state-owned” socialism, the bureaucratic monopoly bourgeoisie has become the owner of most of the land, collecting high rents from society. All these reasons have led to the extreme backwardness of Chinese agricultural production under imperialism.
After the restoration of capitalism in China in 1976, “the collectivized people's communes for agricultural production were devastated”[3], and Deng Xiaoping and his followers promoted the so-called “household contract responsibility system,” dividing collective land into plots for individual households to farm. As a result, small-scale peasant economy quickly reestablished itself in China and became the main form of agricultural production. Data from the “Third National Agricultural Census” in China show that in 2019, over 98% of all agricultural operators were small farmers, accounting for over 90% of agricultural workers, with small farmers cultivating more than 70% of the total arable land. Among China’s 230 million farming households, 210 million households cultivated less than 10 acres of land![4] Furthermore, the median disposable income of rural residents in 2022 was only 17,734 yuan, and the per capita disposable income of low-income rural residents (20% of rural population) was only 5,025 yuan! With such meager income, Chinese small farmers are unable to afford expensive agricultural machinery, let alone organize large-scale agricultural production on scattered lands. The backwardness of mechanization is a major obstacle to China’s agricultural development. Although official data show that China’s “agricultural mechanization rate” reached 72.03% in 2021, this figure only includes plowing, planting, and harvesting, and does not reflect the full mechanization level of agricultural production. If calculated based on farm mechanization rate, China’s overall mechanization rate is only 55%, far below the >95% in the U.S. and Europe, and even lower than Russia (85%), Brazil (75%), and Japan (70%), slightly higher than India (40%). Regarding tractors, China has only 83.7 per 100 square kilometers, far below the U.S. (256.8), Europe (688.7), and even India (129.9).[5] Moreover, among China’s already scarce agricultural machinery, small-scale machinery dominates, such as micro-tillers, which accounted for over 30% of total agricultural machinery sales in 2021. Due to the widespread existence of small-scale peasant economy and cheap labor, Chinese agriculture still relies heavily on outdated manual labor. In Heilongjiang Province, which claims the highest comprehensive mechanization rate (96.8%), large amounts of labor are transported by rail from other regions every rice planting season—over 1.9 million trips from 2000 to 2024, dubbed “transplanting rice trains” to help farmers get rich! In 2008, Xinjiang saw a “spectacle” of 700,000 migrant workers entering the region for cotton picking, with over two-thirds coming from outside areas. Currently, nearly 100,000 migrant workers are still employed annually in Xinjiang cotton harvesting. The lack of mechanization and reliance on manual labor lead to low labor productivity and high costs for Chinese agricultural products. In 2017, China’s corn and wheat yields per acre were only 64.86% and 67.73% of U.S. levels.[6] In 2014, the per-acre costs of Chinese corn, wheat, and long-staple cotton were 52.67%, 202.82%, and 306.18% higher than in the U.S., with labor costs accounting for about 40% of total costs (in a country known for cheap labor!).[7] Overall,The revival of private peasant economy is a major reason for the serious backwardness of Chinese agriculture. In the past socialist China, not only was grain completely self-sufficient, but there was also surplus for export; whereas today, under capitalism and imperialism, food self-sufficiency is only 65.8%, and the consumption of crops such as soybeans is almost entirely dependent on imports (2023, China imported 160 million tons of grain, including 99.41 million tons of soybeans). However, the despicable revisionist ruling clique avoids mentioning the extremely backward state of Chinese agriculture, and shamelessly claims that China’s “large population and limited land” is a “basic national condition” that will not and cannot change in the long term, and that “intensive cultivation” on small plots of land is a necessary measure inherited from ancestors to firmly hold the rice bowl, in order to portray their retrogressive and capitalist-reinstating “achievements”—a large peasant economy—as “always being like this.” Not only that, they also turn the tables and shamelessly slander the achievements of agricultural collectivization during the socialist period, claiming “big pot meals and lazy people,” while also saying that Chinese people “cannot get enough to eat,” which is truly confusing! But in reality, under the guidance of Chairman Mao’s revolutionary line and the efforts of the entire nation, socialist China’s agriculture has developed rapidly: the annual grain growth rate reached 4%, and the per capita grain output gap with the United States shrank from 2.8 tons in 1949 to 0.7 tons in 1970, making surpassing the US a matter of days. After the reform and opening up, China’s grain growth rate has slowed year by year, from 3% in the 1980s to about 1% in the 2010s of this century (official data, with negative growth also occurring over the thirty years), and the gap in per capita grain output with the US widened again to 1.2 tons in 2022! The main culprit for China’s extremely backward agriculture and the fact that Chinese people cannot get enough to eat is not others, but the Chinese revisionist ruling group itself!
High land rent is also a significant obstacle to the development of Chinese agriculture. “Because China’s bureaucratic monopoly bourgeoisie is formed from the capitalist-roaders within the Communist Party, they are very cunning, adept at ‘carrying the red flag to oppose the red flag’—distorting and falsifying Marxism to achieve their goals.”[8] After achieving the restoration, they shamelessly declare that China is still a “socialist country,” with “land owned by the state or collectively,” while using this red cover to restore large landownership. Through institutions like the “State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission” and village committees, they transform into new landlords, collecting land rent under names like “land contracting fees” and “land management rights transfer fees,” greedily siphoning the blood and sweat of Chinese rural workers. According to data from the Shandong Province (the province with the highest agricultural output in China) public resource trading platform in December 2023, the average land contracting fee in Shandong reaches as high as 950 yuan per mu[9]; in comparison, in California, the US’s highest agricultural output state, the average cash rent is only 379 yuan per mu; meanwhile, the per capita disposable income of rural residents in Shandong is only 23,776 yuan, while the average income of agricultural populations in California is 390,000 yuan (this figure should include exploitative classes such as agricultural capitalists). Even in regions with backward agricultural development in China (Qinghai, Tibet), land contracting fees are 200 or 300 yuan per mu, while in the US, in less developed agricultural regions (Alaska), cash rent is only 133 yuan per mu[10]; conversely, the per capita disposable income of rural residents in Qinghai is only 15,614 yuan, while the average income of agricultural populations in Alaska is 310,000 yuan (all figures in RMB). High land rent severely hampers the development of Chinese agriculture. This is because China’s bureaucratic monopoly bourgeoisie, after plundering large amounts of land rent, does not reinvest it into agricultural reproduction or technological improvements, but instead uses it through state finances to maintain and expand non-productive entities like violent agencies, or secretly transfers it into their own pockets through corruption. Moreover, high land rent also discourages more “grain-growing large households” (tenant capitalists) from contracting land for production, as they often can only earn double-digit returns per mu[11], leading bankrupt small farmers to move to cities seeking new livelihoods, resulting in large amounts of abandoned land. According to data from Zhu Daolin, Vice Dean of the College of Land Science and Technology at China Agricultural University, from 1996 to 2008, China’s cultivated land was reduced by more than 10 million mu annually; from 2009 to 2019, the net reduction exceeded 11 million mu annually! The so-called “18 billion mu of arable land red line” claimed by China’s revisionist ruling group is a joke that cannot be maintained, and the reduction of arable land can only mean a decline in agricultural production. The high land rent in contemporary China has become a major stubborn disease causing serious backwardness in agricultural development.
Additionally, under capitalism, the process of agriculture providing food, raw materials, markets, capital, and labor for industry is a process of increasing urban exploitation of rural areas. China’s bureaucratic monopoly bourgeoisie always regards the countryside as a place to plunder grain and raw materials and a market for dumping inferior industrial products. They promote a small number of agricultural capitalists under the guise of “rural revitalization to increase income for 600 million farmers,” and under the slogan “lucid waters and lush mountains are invaluable assets,” they greedily develop rural natural resources. “Home appliances going to the countryside,” inferior industrial products flooding in; “consumption upgrading,” farmers suffering from “scissors difference” exploitation. All these lead to extreme poverty among rural workers. Since 1978, the per capita disposable income of rural residents has always been lower than that of urban residents. Moreover, because the growth rate of the former lags far behind the latter, the gap has been widening, from 209 yuan in 1978 to 30,130 yuan in 2023. At the same time, China’s bourgeoisie, due to low profit margins and slow capital turnover, is unwilling to invest in agriculture: in 2023, China’s added value of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, and fishery was only 9.45 trillion yuan, compared to nearly 40 trillion yuan in industry, more than four times higher. That year, agricultural investment was only a meager 1 trillion yuan, compared to 16.2 trillion yuan in industrial investment, fifteen times more. Furthermore, many bankrupt small farmers have to seek other ways out, becoming free laborers rushing into cities, leaving behind large tracts of abandoned land and outdated tools. In short, as long as the capitalist system of city exploitation of rural areas exists, the situation of farmers lacking reasonable income, agriculture lacking substantial funds, and rural areas lacking available land and labor will persist, and Chinese agriculture cannot develop.
In summary, Chinese agriculture has suffered a catastrophic blow due to the revival and consolidation of the capitalist system, falling into extreme backwardness. The responsibility for this lies not with others, but with China’s bureaucratic monopoly bourgeoisie. Their reckless actions have caused various deformities in the development of Chinese agriculture and rural areas, plunging Chinese farmers back into poverty and bankruptcy. However, this situation cannot and will not continue. “The coming of a new revolution, like the coming of a new crisis, is inevitable.”[12] In the near future, with the increasingly intensified class contradictions in Chinese society and the inevitable outbreak of imperialist world war, the broad masses of working farmers will, together with the working class, shake off exploitation and oppression in the socialist revolution against capitalism, imperialism, and revisionism, and establish a truly socialist new countryside on China’s vast land.
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Lenin: “The Bankruptcy of the Second International,” in “Collected Works of Lenin,” Volume 21, People’s Publishing House, 1959. ↑
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Alexander Apostolides, et al. “English agricultural output and labour productivity, 1250-1850: Some preliminary estimates.” 2008. ↑
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Fenghuo Flame: “The Road to Future Revolution in China.” ↑
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National Bureau of Statistics: “The Third National Agricultural Census Bulletin.” ↑
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“What is Agricultural Mechanization? What is its significance for agricultural development? An overview of mechanization rates in various countries,” https://www.sgpjbg.com/info/30810.html. ↑
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“Comparison of crop yields per mu in China and the US: Where is the US ahead in agricultural development and production level?” https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1810509359334398946. ↑
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“How big is the gap in grain planting between China and the US? China’s costs are 80% higher, and yields are half,” https://www.jiemian.com/article/1120011.html. ↑
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Fenghuo Flame: “The Road to Future Revolution in China.” ↑
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Since China’s official statistics on land contracting fees nationwide are unavailable, these data and those from Qinghai and Tibet are based on selected projects from the provincial public resource trading platforms published in December 2023, with data collection in May 2024, and may differ slightly from actual conditions. ↑
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United States Department of Agriculture National Agricultural Statistics Service. ↑
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According to a 2021 survey by the “Chinese Village Economy” research team at Nanjing Forestry University in Wuxi, Jiangsu Province, the average profit per mu for “large-scale grain growers” is only 34 yuan. ↑
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Marx: “The Class Struggles in France, 1848–1850,” in “Selected Works of Marx and Engels,” Volume 1, People’s Publishing House, 1972. ↑